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The Cape High Court recently (27 August 2018) overturned on 
appeal the conviction and sentence of a 62-year old man 
convicted in the Wynberg Regional Court of murder because the 
trial court failed to protect his right to a fair trial by not making 
special arrangements for his hearing and speech impairment, 
the refusal to admit potentially crucial testimony, and the 
negative bias of the presiding officer. In Kruse v S (Case no. A 
100/2018) the High Court was scathing of the trial court for its 
lack of sensitivity and understanding in dealing with hearing and 
speech impaired accused persons despite good precedent 
existing in law. Kruse was convicted in 2015 for the shooting to 
death of one Nashief Davids, an act he claimed was committed 
in self-defence, and upon conviction was sentenced to 15 years 
imprisonment, of which five years were suspended 
conditionally for five years.  
The High Court neatly sets out the importance of the right to a 
fair trial and the duty of the court to protect that right by, 
amongst others, ensuring that the accused is able to participate 
meaningfully in the trial. Citing a case from 1916 the High Court 
noted: “The presence of the accused means not merely that he 
must be physically in attendance, but also that he must be 
capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings.” The 
judgment also cites the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944 noting 
that that there is a duty on the presiding officer to consider 
whether the accused is sufficiently conversant with the 
language in which evidence is given and, if necessary, to employ 
the services of a competent interpreter to assist the accused.  
Moreover, that the failure to do so amounted to a serious 
irregularity justifying the setting aside of a conviction.  In short, 
effective communication is imperative for a fair trial.  
The High Court further stated that the presiding officer must 
satisfy him or herself on ‘proper grounds’ that the accused will 
be able to follow proceedings and that the word of the 
accused’s legal representative is not sufficient as this person 
may be operating under misconceptions of the accused 
person’s abilities. If there is any doubt the presiding officer must 
order an expert assessment and based on the result of such an 
assessment an appropriate interpreter must be appointed to 
ensure that the accused is able to fully participate in the trial.  
At the trial in the regional court the accused informed the court 
that he was deaf and would require a sign language interpreter 
(SLI) but when the trial commenced with the SLI, Kruse informed 




the court that he did not understand sign language that well and 
could not follow the SLI, a fact confirmed by the magistrate. The 
accused then requested the services of a specific SLI from the 
De La Bat School for the deaf where he had spent some six 
months in his youth, but this request was ignored.  
However, the Magistrate satisfied herself that the accused 
could read and write and was told by counsel for the accused 
that he had been communicating in writing with his client, and 
she directed that the trial must proceed. What followed was a 
makeshift system of handwritten recording and translation 
from English to Afrikaans administered by a court interpreter for 
the benefit of the accused. As each State witness finished 
testifying in chief the translated notes were given to the accused 
and his counsel prior to cross examination.  
The High Court found this to be highly problematic because the 
interpretation was sub-standard as it was not continuous, 
precise, competent and contemporaneous. Firstly, the 
interpreter was required to translate and record at the same 
time whilst there is no provision for this in the Magistrates Act 
and a court stenographer should have been used. In effect, the 
accused received a written summary of what was said. 
Secondly, because the accused was only able to read the notes 
of the interpreter at the end of each witness’s testimony the 
translation was not contemporaneous – the translation must be 
immediate and direct. Thirdly, from the record it is evident that 
the accused was not always given the opportunity to properly 
consider what was said. Fourth, the magistrate instructed the 
accused that he can answer by speaking but that he must write 
all his answers down. In the view of the High Court, the 
magistrate, instead of assisting the accused, made his 
communication more onerous. At times the accused resorted to 
hand gestures and it is unclear to what extent this was 
understood. It was also evident that the accused did not 
understand some questions as his answers were off point. The 
magistrate also refused that the accused’s son testifies as he 
would, in her opinion, have nothing to contribute. The son’s 
intended testimony was indeed aimed at explaining how his 
father communicates and that this would have been relevant to 
the shooting incident. The High Court also remarked on the 
insensitive and prejudicial attitude of the Magistrate towards 
the accused’s communication abilities as reflected in her views 
that he was not truthful about his disabilities. This she did 
without verifying the extent of his impairment with expert 
testimony. The accused’s hearing impairment should not have 
been an issue during the trial at all.  
The effect of all this was that the accused was excluded from 
the trial in large parts as he did not receive contemporaneous 
interpretation and at other times were simply ignored by both 
the presiding officer and his counsel. The judgment concludes 
that there was a miscarriage of justice on several grounds, being 
the denial of the accused’s right to a properly qualified 
interpreter, the refusal to allow his son to testify, and the 
negative bias of the presiding officer. The accused was thus not 
afforded a fair trial and the murder conviction cannot stand. 
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